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Introductory Remarks and a
Comment on Civil RICO's Remedial
Provisions
Robert K. Rasmussen*
This Symposium comes at a very opportune time. RICO seems to
be on everyone's mind. The attention that RICO has garnered in the
last few years in the courts, the press, and the legal academy has in-
creased steadily, and the cries for change, at least from some quarters,
have become deafening. Judge David Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals recently labeled RICO "The Monster That Ate Jurispru-
dence;"1 Chief Justice William Rehnquist has repeatedly called for a
defederalization of RICO;2 and groups as diverse as the Wall Street
Journal, the Washington Post, and the American Civil Liberties Union
have argued vociferously for a curtailment of the present statute.
Four years ago the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.3 pointedly told Congress that the remedy for the perceived over-
breadth of RICO lies with the legislative branch. Despite this open invi-
tation and a variety of legislative proposals, Congress has yet to address
these problems. In each legislative session RICO opponents bravely pre-
dict that the days of the extant version of RICO are numbered. Every
session to date, including the latest one? however, has failed to produce
the promised amendment.
In addition to the movement for statutory amendment, the current
version of RICO now faces Justice Antonin Scalia's not so veiled threat
last term in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,4 that the
Court would find the statute unconstitutionally vague when presented
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., Loyola University of Chicago, 1982;
J.D., University of Chicago, 1985. This text is the revised version of remarks delivered Nov. 9,
1989, at the Vanderbilt Law Review's Symposium on RICO. I would like to thank Jason S. John-
ston for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of these remarks.
1. Wounding the RICO Beast, Wash. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at F2, col. 1.
2. See Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5
(1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institution's Eleventh Seminar on the Administra-
tion of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989); Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases out of My Courtroom, Wall St. J., May
19, 1989, at A14, col. 4.
3. 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985).
4. 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2908-09 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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with the appropriate case. Three other Justices joined Justice Scalia in
raising the possibility that the Constitution may limit RICO's future.
Despite this outcry for change, RICO is not without its defenders.
Few would contest the proposition that RICO has enabled the United
States Attorneys, with guidance from the Criminal Division of the De-
partment of Justice, to secure a number of important convictions. Fed-
eral prosecutors readily admit that RICO has become one of the
government's more effective tools for attacking drug trafficking and offi-
cial corruption. Any proposed change in RICO must be measured not
only in terms of its purported benefits in decreasing the statute's per-
ceived abuses, but also in terms of the costs that it may impose on de-
sirable law enforcement efforts.
With this uncertainty surrounding RICO, the Vanderbilt Law Re-
view Symposium attempts to assess the current state of RICO, and to
set forth the arguments over its appropriate future course. It has fallen
to me to preface this enterprise, and I think that the proper place to
begin this Symposium is with a short description of RICO's statutory
framework. It is this framework that RICO opponents cite as the root of
the problem.
Passed in 1970, RICO had what all agree is a noble and uplifting
purpose, namely, the rooting out of organized crime from legitimate
business. Spurred on by the 1967 Report of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,5 Congress feared
that organized crime had begun to move from its traditional revenue
raising activities such as gambling and prostitution, into what, on their
face, were legitimate business activities.
While academics continue to disagree over whether Congress in-
tended RICO to extend beyond the paradigmatic case of an organized
crime family running a legitimate business, it is well settled that RICO
today ranges far beyond such a situation. As is now well known, the
ubiquity of RICO in the federal courts arises from the statute's capa-
cious language. Section 1962 of title 18 of the United States Code delin-
eates what constitutes a RICO violation. The operative terms in this
provision are "pattern of racketeering activity" and "enterprise." Basi-
cally, section 1962 prohibits (1) the use of money gained from a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" in acquiring or operating any "enterprise"
engaged in interstate commerce;6 (2) the acquisition of such an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity;7 (3) the running of such
5. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
7. Id. § 1962(b).
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an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;' and (4) the
conspiracy to do any of these activities." Simply put, almost any con-
nection between a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise en-
gaged in interstate commerce constitutes a RICO violation.
Section 1961 defines the terms "pattern of racketeering activity"
and "enterprise," and these definitions more than anything else give
RICO its expansive reach. While section 1961 purports to define "pat-
tern of racketeering activity," in reality it only places modest con-
straints on the term's outer limits. The statute simply states that a
pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity that occurred during the last ten years.10 As the Court
noted last Term, "developing a meaningful concept of 'pattern' within
the existing statutory framework has proved to be no easy task."' Even
after the Court's attempt at defining what constitutes a "pattern," it is
clear that the "pattern" requirement-whatever it is-places little con-
straint on RICO's reach.
Similarly, the definition of "enterprise" in section 1961 fails to ex-
clude any significant class of cases from RICO. Section 1961 defines
"enterprise" to include any individual, partnership, corporation, associ-
ation or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact although not a legal entity. 2 It is difficult to think of a way
Congress could have defined "enterprise" in a broader fashion.
Thus, the definitions of "pattern" and "enterprise" do little to
place meaningful limits on RICO's scope. Neither, however, do they in
and of themselves bring any actual conduct within RICO's maw. This
task is left to section 1961's definition of "racketeering activity." It is
this definition that gives RICO its catholic character. Section 1961 di-
vides racketeering activities into three rather broad categories. The first
contains state law crimes including any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in ob-
scene matter, or dealing in narcotic or dangerous drugs, that are pun-
ishable under state law by imprisonment for more than one year.' The
second category includes acts criminalized by various provisions of the
United States Code. These acts are those of bribery, sports bribery,
counterfeiting, theft from interstate shipment, embezzlement from pen-
sion and welfare funds, extortionate credit transactions, transmission of
gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, trafficking in obscene ma-
8. Id. § 1962(c).
9. Id. § 1962(d).
10. Id. § 1961(5).
11. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
13. Id. § 1961(1)(A).
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terial, sexual exploitation of children, money laundering, dealing in sto-
len cars, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations,
obstruction of state or local law enforcement, interference with com-
merce, racketeering, interstate transportation of wagering parapherna-
lia, receiving unlawful welfare fund payments, illegal gambling,
interstate transportation of stolen property, trafficking in contraband
cigarettes, engaging in white slavery, and violating restrictions on loans
to labor unions. 14 The final group of racketeering activity under section
1961 includes bankruptcy fraud, security fraud, and drug dealing.15
These "racketeering activities" have come to be called "predicate
acts." The two predicate acts that have received the most attention by
opponents of RICO are those of mail fraud and wire fraud, which sim-
ply prohibit the use of the mails and the wire for fraudulent purposes.1 6
The malleability of these two crimes in the hands of federal prosecu-
tors, and more importantly, private attorneys, has led to the propaga-
tion of RICO suits. Taking section 1961's definitions and reading them
back into section 1962's substantive prohibitions, it becomes readily ap-
parent that RICO is indeed a statute that covers an immense range of
activity. Once a clever lawyer can characterize an opponent's actions as
constituting one or two of the myriad of predicate acts, it takes little
imagination to deem those actions RICO violations.
Of course, such a substantive sweep alone cannot serve as an in-
dictment of RICO. First one must decide whether the breadth of the
statute is warranted. Even if one concludes that it is not, however, this
conclusion still does not condemn the statute. Even the broadest stat-
ute will have little impact if there are no means for its enforcement.
Indeed, the existence of the crimes of mail fraud and wire fraud have
existed since the last century and yet have failed to raise the substan-
tial outcry accompanying RICO. This failure can be largely attributed
to the fact that they do not contain private causes of action. Thus, any
analysis of the impact of RICO's substantive prohibitions cannot be di-
vorced from an analysis of its remedial provisions. A statute's bark sim-
ply may not be accompanied by a notable bite.
RICO's bark, however, is accompanied by a bite worthy of a pit
bull. This bite can be felt either through criminal or civil penalties. Sec-
tion 1963 delineates RICO's criminal penalties. It provides a maximum
prison term of twenty years, or life when the underlying predicate of-
14. Id. § 1961(1)(B), (C).
15. Id. § 1961(D).
16. See id. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud). Susan Getzendanner argues that these
two predicate acts should be eliminated. See Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Vari-
ety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REv. 673,
679-81 (1990).
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fense carries a life sentence. 17 Such penalties do not seem overly harsh.
The true force of the criminal penalties, however, is RICO's forfeiture
provision. Section 1963 authorizes the forfeiture of (1) any interest the
defendant received by virtue of committing a RICO violation,"8 (2) any
interest in any enterprise that has been established or run in violation
of RICO,19 and (3) any proceeds the defendant received from commit-
ting RICO violations. 20 This forfeiture provision is not linked to the
harm caused by the RICO violations themselves; whatever RICO
touches, the convicted defendant loses.
Moreover, forfeiture under section 1963 occurs when the RICO of-
fense is committed, not upon conviction. The government thus is able
to trace assets to the hands of third parties, and recover these assets so
long as the third party had reasonable cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture.2' The Supreme Court confirmed the im-
port of this provision last Term when it held that such tracing includes
the recovery of monies paid by RICO defendants to their attorneys.2 In
addition to this postconviction remedy, the government also, in order to
ensure that forfeitable property does not disappear during trial, has the
right to get a temporary restraining order and injunction to prevent dis-
sipation of the property. ' s Shortly before this Symposium began, the
Justice Department issued a clarification of when it will seek to use
these draconian provisions.2 4 The appropriateness of the so-called
"criminal RICO" provisions continues to be debated.25
Despite the creation of the potent weapon of forfeiture, Congress
did not leave the enforcement of RICO's broad provisions to federal
prosecutors. Instead, it added a civil remedy, under the now familiar
guise of the private attorney general rationale. This remedy is set forth
in section 1964(c). Modeled after the country's antitrust laws, this stat-
ute provides that any person injured by a RICO violation may sue in
federal court and recover treble damages plus reasonable attorney's
fees.28 It is this civil remedy, coupled with the ingenuity of lawyers, that
has resulted in the use of RICO in a variety of unexpected situations.
Like many, I find serious difficulties in the current version of
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
18. Id. § 1963(a)(1).
19. Id. § 1963(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1963(a)(3).
21. Id. § 1963(c).
22. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1988).
24. CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (1989).
25. See generally Dennis, Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 651 (1990); Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691 (1990).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
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RICO. Before commenting on the provision of RICO I find particularly
objectionable (treble damages), I want to note a few considerations that
I think should be considered when assessing any of the proposals made
during this Symposium. The first thought is in the nature of a caveat:
When considering proposals for change one must measure the benefits
of reducing RICO abuse against the costs of reducing beneficial RICO
use. RICO bashing has become fashionable for those of all political per-
suasions. In such a heated atmosphere, it is easy to focus solely on per-
ceived problems and propose legislative amendments that strike at
these problems swiftly and surely. What often gets lost in such a state
of affairs is the question of whether a proposed course of action would
frustrate what are some of the undeniably proper uses of RICO.
When evaluating the proposals coming out of this Symposium, it is
also important to keep in mind the concern for federalism. One need
not see an encroachment on federalism behind every bush before ques-
tioning the wisdom of the current statutory scheme. The list of predi-
cate acts captures a great many areas normally thought to be the
exclusive domain of state law. The predicate acts include both overtly
state law crimes and broad federal crimes, such as mail fraud and wire
fraud, into which many state law violations can be shoehorned. Any re-
thinking of RICO should consider the appropriate division of authority
between federal and state courts.
Another point that should be considered, assuming that problems
exist with RICO which should be addressed (and I think there are), is
whether Congress should modify the substantive scope of RICO or its
remedial provisions. The resolution of this question depends on what
one views as problems with RICO. Those who by and large are happy
with the results that have been obtained under criminal RICO but ob-
ject to what Justice Thurgood Marshall described as civil RICO's "fed-
eralization of broad areas of state common law of frauds"2 will favor
tinkering with the remedial portions of RICO. Those who decry the
threat that RICO makes by its broad terms support restrictions in the
substantive coverage of RICO.
Members of the latter camp must address a final question: How
much do we as a society trust prosecutorial discretion? By criminalizing
a wide range of conduct, Congress entrusted the executive branch in
general and the Department of Justice in particular with deciding when
the draconian sanctions of RICO should be brought to bear on a given
activity. Those who do not trust the prosecutors to make this decision
wisely must do more than state the truism that "we are a government
of laws, not of men." All laws involve a degree of discretion in their
27. 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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enforcement, but the real concerns are how to decide what constitutes
too much discretion, and whether prosecutors employ too much discre-
tion in their enforcement of RICO. In answering these questions, we
also must decide whether to focus on potential abuses, which would
conflate the reach of criminal RICO with that of civil RICO, or on ac-
tual uses of criminal RICO, which to date have been far more
restrained.
I raise these points because I find them both important and diffi-
cult. Although I have some thoughts on the appropriate resolution of
these issues, I am content for the present moment not to burden this
audience with my tentative conclusions about them. I mention these
considerations more as tools for evaluating the products of this Sympo-
sium rather than as firm conclusions in and of themselves.
There is one issue, however, that I do wish to discuss briefly be-
cause, quite frankly, I find it to be a relatively easy question: Whether
the current damages provision for private civil RICO suits"8 should be
amended. It should. Much of the current controversy over RICO fo-
cuses on the statute's civil damages provision. This provision awards
victorious plaintiffs treble damages plus attorney's fees. Much has been
written over the lack of congressional thought that accompanied the in-
clusion of a civil damages provision in RICO. I do not wish to canvass
this material; rather, I simply want to address, as a normative matter,
the merits of RICO's current trebling of damages and award of attor-
ney's fees. Moreover, in the interest of brevity, I attempt to adumbrate
my thoughts on the matter rather than attempting to set them forth in
great detail.
Let me state my conclusion first: Two basic flaws exist in the cur-
rent version of civil RICO's damages provision. The first is that there is
little justification for a multiplier and the one-way shifting of attorney's
fees in the context of commercial disputes, the area in which civil RICO
seems to be most often invoked. ' The second is that the damages pro-
vision promotes what I call "theory-shopping," by which I mean the
incentive of lawyers to frame an otherwise state law claim into a civil
RICO claim simply to obtain the possibility of recovering treble dam-
ages plus attorney's fees. I explain these conclusions in turn.
To evaluate the appropriateness of RICO's civil damages provision,
one first must answer the general question of why we as a society subsi-
dize a judicial system that awards damages to injured parties in private
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
29. See generally Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (stating that "[i]n practice ... [the civil RICO]
provision frequently has been invoked against legitimate business in ordinary commercial set-




disputes. The normative desirability of awarding treble damages and
attorney's fees cannot be answered either by their existence in RICO, or
their existence in other statutes, such as the Clayton Act.30 Only when
we decide what role civil damages should play in our society can we
intelligently address the question of what constitutes the appropriate
level of damages.
The obvious answer for why we award civil damages is that such
damages deter conduct that society, through legislative or common-law
decision making, has deemed inappropriate. By penalizing those who
engage in such conduct, we make it less likely that people will under-
take such conduct.". The seller who promises to ship working radios but
is tempted to ship nothing but transistors knows that he will face pay-
ing contract damages if he acts on this temptation. The expectation of
paying damages, along with the seller's interest in preserving his or her
reputation, forces the seller to heed society's judgment that, as a gen-
eral matter, parties should live up to their contractual obligations.
Identifying deterrence as a rationale for awarding damages, how-
ever, cannot end the inquiry.32 As is common with many questions, the
obvious answer in the case of why we have civil damages is incomplete.
This incompleteness arises from the problem of over-deterrence; if
damages are set at too high a level, such as a total forfeiture of assets
from the injuring party to the injured party, two distinct problems
arise. The first is that parties will not even attempt to undertake con-
duct that falls close to the line between legal and prohibited conduct.
Even if the line demarcating liability from nonliability is clear, which it
often is not, the uncertainties inherent in the judicial system will cause
parties to shy away from the line. The cost to society in such a situation
is that the actor is deterred from engaging in conduct that society has
not determined to be socially undesirable. For example, if the penalty
for Alaskan oil spills is bankruptcy, few major oil firms would want to
30. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
15(a) (1988)). But see Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV.
827, 871 (1987) (stating that "RICO is not unique; it is merely one of numerous federal statutes
providing [treble damages]").
31. One also might suggest that damages are designed to compensate injured parties. I find
this suggestion unhelpful. The problem with such a suggestion is that it readily collapses in the
deterrence rationale. The driving force behind the compensation rationale, at least in cases other
than that of strict liability, is that the defendant has engaged in inappropriate conduct. Thus, we
quickly come back to the notion that there is certain conduct which society has deemed
inappropriate.
In any event, such a rationale at most would provide for single damages, which may or may
not include an award of attorney's fees. The proponents of the current version of civil RICO's
damages provision make no case by relying on the compensatory nature of damages.
32. But see Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 834-35 (focusing solely on the deterrence rationale
without articulating a limiting principle).
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discover and ship oil from Alaska, even though we as a society are bet-
ter off developing our own oil resources.
The second form of over-deterrence stems from the fact that it is
often difficult to determine before the fact that a certain type of genera-
lized conduct is always undesirable. Perhaps the best example of this
point is the recent literature on the theory of efficient breach of con-
tract. As a general matter, society is better off if people are encouraged
to live up to their promises. A procedure to enforce promises, under-
written by the public fisc, helps to reduce the uncertainty, and there-
fore the costs, of doing business. Yet there are occasions when all would
be better off if promisors broke their promises. For example, one can
readily imagine a seller of paper in Georgia contracting to sell a ton of
paper to a buyer in Chicago for 100 dollars on January 1. If on January
1 the market price for a ton of paper in Chicago is 102 dollars, but the
market price in Georgia is 105 dollars, society is better off if the seller
breaches because the paper will end up in the hands of the party that
values it the most. If we set the damages in this case at too high a
level-anything over five dollars-the seller would have no incentive to
make the socially optimal choice. 3
Generalizing from these observations, optimal damages should both
encourage actors to avoid socially undesirable conduct and at the same
time not deter them from engaging in socially desirable conduct. To
achieve this result, it is necessary for actors both to receive the benefits
of their actions and to bear the cost of those actions. When actors are
forced to balance the full cost of their actions against the full benefits,
they are most likely to pursue only that conduct which produces a net
gain. Stated differently, an optimal damages rule would internalize both
the costs and the benefits of any given conduct.
This observation leads directly to the conclusion that the inquiry
into a law's appropriate remedial provisions cannot be divorced from
the law's substantive provisions. This truth can be seen when we ask
what, as a general matter, the benchmark damage provision should be.
As a general matter, most parties reap the full benefits of their actions.
In other words, they will internalize the benefit of their actions without
any stimulus from the legal system.
The more pervasive problem is making parties internalize the cost
of their actions. Absent a legal regime, the party who intentionally
breaches a contract obtains the benefits of the breach, while placing the
cost of the breach upon the party with whom he or she had contracted.
33. For a similar analysis, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 U. Cm. L. REV. 611, 614-15 (1985). For a general discussion of contract damages, see R. POSNER,
EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 105-22 (3d ed. 1986).
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If we lived in a world in which the legal system always correctly identi-
fied those persons who impose costs on others, the legal rule that would
force such persons to internalize the cost of their behavior would be
obvious: actual damages. If a party to a contract knew for a certainty
that he or she would be liable for actual damages if he or she breached
the contract, that party would only breach if the benefits of the breach
exceeded the cost. In other words, the party would breach only if the
assets involved would be put to a better use than they would be if the
contract were performed. Thus, in a world of perfect enforcement, the
optimal damage rule would be to award actual damages because it
forces actors to weigh the costs of their actions against the benefits.
Of course, actual damages is not always the optimal damages rule.
The linchpin of the actual damage rule is the critical assumption that
the probability of paying actual damages is always one hundred per-
cent. 4 As soon as the possibility of paying damages decreases from a
certainty, wrongdoers are not forced to internalize the expected harm of
their actions. If persons deciding whether to perform contracts believe
that there is only a fifty percent chance that they will have to pay the
damages breach will cause, they may choose to breach even in situa-
tions in which, from society's standpoint, it would be better if they were
to perform the contractual obligations. 5
The probability of paying damages decreases from one hundred
percent for a variety of reasons, such as the possibility that the actor's
conduct will not be detected, the likelihood that not every party suffer-
ing harm will have the incentive to bring a lawsuit, the fact that some
people may not even realize that they suffer harm, and the possibility
that the legal system incorrectly will conclude that the legal standard
was not violated. Not only will all of these factors lead actors to dis-
count the damages that they would have to pay if they were found lia-
ble, but the importance of these factors in setting a damage rule also
varies depending on the substantive nature of the crime. For example,
in the antitrust context, the allocative loss caused by monopolistic be-
havior normally is not considered part of the damages that a plaintiff is
allowed to recover. It is thus necessary to devise a multiplier to take
account for this fact. Otherwise, a firm deciding whether to engage in
34. This observation assumes that the legal system accurately perceives legal breaches. To
the extent that the system suffers from acute liability determination problems, such problems may
argue for a multiplier coupled with an extremely high burden of proof on the plaintiff. See John-
ston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385
(1987).
35. For an excellent discussion of the role of imperfect detection, see Farber, Reassessing the
Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443, 1455-
68 (1980).
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monopolistic behavior will not be forced to internalize the full cost of
pursuing such a course of action, and thus will be deterred from making
the optimal decision."
Before analyzing RICO's current damage provision in light of these
concerns, I must address a common objection to the above analysis.
This objection centers on the fact that RICO offenses are not, like ordi-
nary tort or contract cases, merely the domain of private law. Rather,
the objection rests in the fact that all RICO offenders must be shown to
have committed a crime. This fact alone, it may be suggested, justifies
ignoring notions of efficiency. 37 According to this argument, racketeer-
ing is simply bad, and we should not countenance the notion of efficient
racketeering behavior.
This argument is wanting because it fails to acknowledge RICO's
expansive scope. This failure leads to analysis that focuses on the wrong
paradigmatic case. Congress may have intended RICO's main, if not ex-
clusive, focus to be the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime. If RICO's reach was in fact cabined to such situations, the argu-
ment that all RICO violations are inherently bad and should be sanc-
tioned might have some merit. Yet not only is RICO's reach much
broader than in the case of infiltration of legitimate business by organ-
ized crime, in practice civil RICO has little to do with such situations.
One cannot be surprised by the fact that RICO's civil provisions have
had little, if any, effect on the country's fight against organized crime.3 8
The reasons for this result are fairly obvious. Normally, the only
risk that a plaintiff undertakes in bringing suit is the risk of losing,
which translates into paying one's own attorney's fees. The costs of
bringing a suit against organized crime, however, are much higher.
RICO's promise of treble damages plus attorney's fees simply is not
enough to induce potential plaintiffs to undertake the risk that organ-
ized crime will bypass the legal process and resort to its traditional
means of dispute resolution.
This failure does not mean that civil RICO has been consigned to
relative obscurity. It most certainly has not. The predicate offenses in-
volved in the bulk of civil RICO suits seem to be those of mail fraud
and wire fraud. The criminalization of these acts, however, cannot serve
36. See Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 445, 454-58 (1985).
37. See, e.g., Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An Alter-
native Measurement of Damages Under Civil RICO, 33 VILL. L. REv. 239, 250-64 (1988).
38. See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Brought Under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c): Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1985) (testimony of Stephen S.
Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Assistant Attorney
General Trott stated that "private civil RICO has not had a significant impact on the organized
crime problem in the United States.. . . I think the private attorney general concept ... has not
borne the fruit expected of it by the authors of this statutory scheme." Id.
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as the basis for jettisoning notions of efficiency in assessing the appro-
priateness of RICO's damages provision. In a real sense, the crimes of
mail fraud and wire fraud are crimes in name only.39 The breadth of
these statutes is constrained severely by prosecutorial discretion. Only a
small fraction of activities that could be deemed mail fraud or wire
fraud ever catch the interest of federal prosecutors.
Thus, the fact that RICO involves crimes has no impact on deter-
mining what the optimal damage rule for civil RICO should be. In as-
sessing the desirability of treble damages plus attorney's fees, however,
it is necessary, for the reasons discussed above, to have in mind the
"typical" RICO case. Only by having some indication of the nature of
such an action can we intelligently ask whether a move away from the
baseline of actual damages is warranted. For reasons just discussed,
Congress's view of a typical RICO case simply cannot serve as the ap-
propriate vehicle for determining the optimal damage rule for civil
RICO. The paradigm that should be used is a dispute between two
businesses. I choose this paradigm for three reasons. First, it is my im-
pression that a plurality, if not a majority, of RICO cases are of this
nature. Although I do not profess to have extensive empirical evidence
on the point, many RICO cases in fact do appear to fit this description,
and given the treble damages provision, all commercial lawyers have an
incentive to turn their ordinary business suits into RICO cases. Second,
even if I am mistaken on the first point, the competing choices for the
"typical" RICO case that might be put forward-labor corruption, offi-
cial corruption, and securities fraud-can be handled better through
the existing federal statutes governing labor organizations, bribery, and
the sale of securities. It is the ordinary business dispute that is the hall-
mark of civil RICO. To be sure, this ordinary business litigation does
not encompass all of the uses of civil RICO. Yet it cannot be gainsaid
that such litigation comprises a substantial percentage of all civil RICO
suits. If the defenders of civil RICO flounder on the rocks of commer-
cial litigation, it seems to me that they must then supply a justification
for the remaining uses of civil RICO along with a narrowing statute.
Finally, quite frankly, as a professor of commercial law, it is the use of
civil RICO in the commercial context that draws my academic interest.
Once commercial litigation becomes the testing ground for civil
RICO's damages provision, the extant rule fails miserably. Simply
stated, few reasons in this type of litigation justify the use of any multi-
plier, let alone one that triples damage awards. As a general matter, in
the commercial context the probability of detection and of the injured
39. For an examination of this point, see Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil
RICO, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1989).
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party bringing a suit approach a near certainty. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant factor in this conclusion is that most breaches in performance
in the commercial setting are relatively easy to detect. One company
usually is readily aware of another company's failure to live up to its
legal duty. For example, when suppliers do not supply the right goods
or when financial predictions turn out to be way off the mark, the party
harmed by such actions generally recognizes the extent and the source
of the harm.
Coupled with this fact are the additional considerations that the
party harmed usually suffers the full extent of the injury and has suffi-
cient incentive to bring suit. Generally, the number of parties involved
in a commercial transaction is relatively small. Moreover, when these
transactions unravel, one party is left, in the absence of a legal rule
shifting the loss, holding the bag. This loss also ordinarily will be well
in excess of the resulting litigation costs. We thus do not have to worry
about the harm being spread among so many actors that none of them
has the incentive to bring suit.
In short, the need to require actors to internalize the costs of their
actions does not justify civil RICO's award of treble damages to victori-
ous plaintiffs. While there may be situations in which an award of ac-
tual damages in the business setting will be insufficient to induce the
injured party to seek redress, it seems that any multiplier is more likely
to make parties overestimate the costs of their action than it is to com-
pensate for the relatively small chance that costs will not be fully inter-
nalized. RICO's current award of treble damages is thus likely to
prevent some parties from engaging in socially beneficial conduct.
There remains the question of RICO's asymmetrical treatment of
attorney's fees. Some may assert that, in the absence of an award of
attorney's fees, injured parties in a regime of actual damages may have
an insufficient incentive to bring suit.40 Two problems exist with this
argument. First, it does not depend in any way on the peculiar nature
of a RICO offense; rather, it is an argument for awarding attorney's fees
in all cases. Second, and more importantly, it does not justify the cur-
rent one-way nature of such fees under RICO. If a firm knows that it
will have to pay for its opponent's fees if it loses a RICO suit brought
against it, but must pay its own fees if it wins, the firm will be more
likely to avoid socially desirable conduct that is close to the RICO line.
Even if one had a regime that awarded only actual damages, a firm de-
40. For example, Professor Michael Goldsmith suggests that, "[b]ecause attorneys fees under
RICO are only available to successful claimants, every plaintiff risks paying counsel costs if the
case is lost or even settled. Given this risk, many potential plaintiffs would forego suit if the ulti-




ciding whether to engage in conduct that might constitute a RICO vio-
lation would have to consider the probability of facing a RICO suit. If
the firm prevails, its cost will be its own fees; if it loses, its cost will not
only be damages, but also its opponent's fees. Thus, as a general matter,
the expected litigation cost of a RICO suit is greater for a defendant
than it is for a plaintiff. Given these costs, businesses systematically will
err on the side of caution in making decisions. In other words, they will
not engage in conduct that approaches the line demarcating the bound-
ary of socially desirable conduct. While there is a legitimate debate over
the desirability of the English Rule on fees as opposed to the American
Rule, I see no justification for the hybrid rule in the RICO context.4'
In other words, I find no reason to believe that the nature of RICO
violations justifies the current damages provision. The appropriate solu-
tion would be to detreble the damages for RICO violations, and then
decide whether there is a subset of current RICO violations in which
trebling is justified. Such an amendment would go a long way toward
curbing RICO abuse.
As mentioned earlier, RICO's treble damages provision creates a
second unnecessary societal cost. It is the cost of what I term "theory
shopping." Most, if not all, current RICO claims are thinly disguised
business disputes that could be brought under state law. The primary
reason these cases become RICO cases is, of course, the prospect of
treble damages and attorney's fees for the prevailing plaintiff. Indeed,
because plaintiffs can append state law claims to their federal RICO
claims, they lose nothing by going into the federal forum while gaining
the ability to seek super-compensatory damages. This benefit not only
increases the expected value of a plaintiff's suit, but it also increases the
leverage the plaintiff will have in settlement negotiations.
There is, however, a cost associated with such action. RICO and
state business law overlap; they do not converge. In other words, the
RICO plaintiffs have to prove more than that they would prevail under
state law. Namely, they must prove that a "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivities" existed, and that a defendant committed the predicate acts.
These matters of proof, which may consume significant litigation ex-
pense both in attorney and court time, do not identify cases for which
trebling is appropriate. Deciding that a tort or a breach of contract also
constitutes mail fraud under federal law describes nothing about the
extent to which a party will internalize the cost of his or her actions
when deciding on a course of conduct. This point has particular bite
when two of these crimes-mail fraud and wire fraud-are, as previ-
ously discussed, crimes in name only. As noted earlier, prosecutorial
41. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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discretion ensures that most conduct that falls within the broad sweep
of the statute's language never is prosecuted. Even given unlimited re-
sources, prosecutors would not seek criminal enforcement against most
parties who find themselves on the wrong end of a civil RICO lawsuit.
The extra requirements that RICO imposes on state law fraud ac-
tions do not identify any reason for a multiplier. They do, however, im-
pose social costs. These costs are of two varieties. The first is the simple
cost of litigating the added elements that RICO requires the successful
plaintiff to prove. Time and money must be spent in proving the exis-
tence of the predicate acts and convincing the trier of fact that these
acts constitute a pattern.
There is a second cost as well. The bonus of treble damages plus
attorney's fees encourages plaintiffs to stretch the predicate acts as
wide as possible. Such a stretch tends to increase uncertainty, and one
can realistically expect that courts will differ in their acceptance of such
attempts at expansion. With such uneven results, it is increasingly diffi-
cult for parties to determine before the fact whether or not their con-
duct will be deemed to fall on the liability side of the RICO line.
Stepping back from a sole focus on the costs that RICO's damages
provision imposes, detrebling RICO awards and eliminating one-way at-
torney's fees would have an added benefit: it would reduce the inroads
that RICO currently makes on federalism. To be sure, some RICO liti-
gation is driven by the desire to get into federal court. Much RICO
litigation, however, is undoubtedly driven by the promise of treble dam-
ages to the victorious plaintiff. It may be difficult to assess the volume
of the flow of litigation back into state courts, but undoubtedly there
would be a great deal. The party deciding whether or not to bring a
state law claim simply faces the choice that every diversity defendant
now faces: which forum would prove more hospitable to the claim. The
attraction of treble damages plus attorney's fees would no longer entice
all plaintiffs into the federal seas.
Thus, it appears that society gains little from RICO's award of
treble damages and one-way shifting of attorney's fees. Were Congress
to detreble damages and provide for a symmetrical treatment of attor-
ney's fees, it would do much to stem current cases of the misuse of
RICO.
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